We consider a New-Keynesian model with …nancial and labour market frictions where …rms borrowing is limited by the enforcement constraint. The wage is set in a bargaining process where the …rm's shareholder and worker share the production surplus. As debt service is considered to be a part of production costs, …rms borrow to reduce the surplus which allows to lower the wage. We study the model's response to …nancial shock under two Taylor-type interest rate rules: …rst one responds to in ‡ation and borrowing, second -to in ‡ation and unemployment. We have found that the second rule delivers better policy in terms of the welfare measure. Additionally, we show that the feedback on unemployment in this rule depends on the extent of workers' bargaining power.
Introduction
Studying simple monetary policy rules is an important topic in monetary economics. Many papers have shown that such rules work remarkably well and often provide good approximations to fully optimal policy (Taylor 1999) . However, relative performance of the particular rule depends on the economic environment postulated in the model. Therefore evaluating the robustness of a speci…c interest rate rule is very important for policy makers (Cote et. al 2004) .
In this note we investigate how the presence of …nancial frictions a¤ects the performance of a Taylor-type monetary policy. In particular, we are interested in the rule with reaction to in ‡ation and unemployment which was advocated in Walsh (2005) , Faia (2008 Faia ( , 2008a ), Blanchard and Gali (2010) among others. We extend the previous analysis by adding …rms'…nancial market frictions and show that the same result holds: the rule with response to in ‡ation and unemployment still performs better than the rule which responds to in ‡ation and borrowing as in Faia (2008) . We also …nd that the coe¢ cient on unemployment in this rule depends on the extent of workers'bargaining power.
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Model
There are four key components that form the model. First, there are households that consume the …nal goods, make a choice to be employed or unemployed, save in riskless assets which yield an interest rate and shares of …rms that pay dividends. Second, we have intermediary goods producers that participate in the labour market by posting vacancies, employing agents and borrowing against their expected future pro…t. Third, there are …nal good producers that take the wholesale goods and sell them to households in the sticky prices (Calvo (1983) ) environment. Finally, there is a central bank which conducts monetary policy.
Firms
The model is populated by two kinds of …rms: intermediary goods producers that participate in the labour and …nancial markets by posting vacancies and borrowing and …nal goods producers that take the intermediary goods and sell them to households in the sticky prices (Calvo (1983) ) environment.
Intermediary good producers
As in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) , there are two types of intermediary goods producers: entrant …rms and old …rms. Entrant …rms are created when the posted vacancy is matched with the worker. After its creation entrant …rm chooses its borrowing which is immediately distributed to the shareholders (households). In the next period, if the match is not separated, entrant …rm starts to produce and pays the wage. It is important to note that here we use the same timing convention as in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) : entrant …rms raise the debt before the bargaining with worker takes place.
Old …rms are the matches, which were not separated during the last period. They must bargain with the current worker and pay a wage, make a decision about future borrowing and produce. Firms in our model have incentives to increase borrowing since high debt reduces the bargaining surplus which, in turn, decreases the wage paid to workers. In addition, the …rms borrowing decision is a¤ected by the interest rate which is set by the monetary authority. For example, reduction in the cost of borrowing (interest rate) would encourage …rms to issue more debt for the given number of posted vacancies. As a result, this would decrease wage and increase unemployment.
-Entrant Firms A new (entrant) …rm is created when the new match occurs between worker and a posted vacancy. Then, the new vacancy, which is …lled by the worker, holds the following value
where i t is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, S t+1 is bargaining surplus, b t+1 captures …rms borrowing, and t+1 is in ‡ation of …nal goods de…ned as t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt . The only decision made by the entrant …rm in the …rst period is the level of b t+1 which is distributed to shareholders.
Firms post vacancies as long as the value of a vacancy is positive. In other words, the value of the …lled vacancy Q t must be greater than the incurred cost k: Thus, we can write the condition under which …rms will keep on posting vacancies as
where q t is the probability that the posted vacancy is going to be …lled. Rearranging equations 1 and 2 we obtain the following expression which links the cost of the labour market (the probability that a posted vacancy will be …lled) with the …nancial market (the …rms'borrowing):
In the next period, if the match is not separated the entrant …rm will become old.
-Old Firms We begin our presentation by de…ning the production function of old …rms where the only input is labour
with z being the constant productivity parameter and N t capturing the number of employed workers. We can intuitively de…ne the number of unemployed agents u t by normalizing the total number of workers in the model to 1 and subtracting those who are employed
Here is the exogenously given probability that a match will be separated. Now N t is de…ned as
where (1 ) N t 1 are matches from the last period which were not separated and m(u t ; v t ) captures newly created matches as in (Pissarides 1987 ) with v t denoting the number of posted vacancies, & being a matching parameter and being a vacancy elasticity of matches. The CRS matching function is given by m(u t ; v t ) = &v t u
where v t is the number of available vacancies. The probability that the posted vacancy will be …lled, q t , is de…ned as
In the same way, the probability that a worker will …nd a job, p E t , is equal to
Using the two above equations and a particular form of the matching function (7), we obtain the relationship between the probability that a vacancy will be …lled and the probability that a worker will …nd a job p
Making use of the de…nition of labour market tightness, t = vt ut , we can rewrite equation (10) as
Now by substituting equations 5, 6 and 11, we can derive the relation between the level of employment and the probability that a worker will …nd a job
Similarly to Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) we set up an equation which de…nes wholesale …rms'equity value in terms of productivity, real wage and borrowing
where w t is wage; -discount factor and X t is a markup de…ned as the price ratio 
When the worker is employed in a wholesale …rm, his value is
where U t is the value of being unemployed which is derived using equations 13, 14, 15:
Here the term in brackets denotes the trade-o¤ between being employed and unemployed. Notice, that using equations 15 and 16 we can express bargaining surplus as
Finally, the real wage is given by
where t is the …rms borrowing parameter subject to a negative shock and is the workers bargaining power. As we can see, wage negatively depends on b t . That is, the higher is the borrowing, the lower is the current wage since the worker gets a fraction of output net debt. Therefore, for the given value of workers bargaining power higher borrowing reduces the wage. See the appendix for details on wage derivation.
Intermediary Goods Producers Financial Market
To begin with, we do not explicitly model the …nancial institutions which are providing loans to …rms. We simply assume that they can issue the required amount of credit. Second, if a match is separated and, as a result, the …rm defaults, then its value is equal to 0 and the lender does not get any compensation. To ensure that …rms do not default when the match is not separated, lenders impose a borrowing constraint whose tightness is de…ned by the parameter t . Third, as in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011), both old …rm and entrant …rm will choose the same level of debt because they are limited by the same borrowing constraint since choice of b t+1 does not depend on wage paid to workers as could be seen from equation 13. The borrowing constraint can be expressed as
Economically speaking, it has two important implications. First, it implies that …rms are borrowing against their future pro…t (denoted as their part of the expected bargaining surplus E t [S t+1 ]) which depends on workers' bargaining power, . Second, we can think of t as being the probability that the …rm will repay its debt, hence it must be between 0 and 1. If it drops, then it means that most of the …rms are not able to meet their …nancial commitments and, as a result, the aggregate level of borrowing falls. We specify the AR(1) process which perturbs the …nancial market (…rms'repayment probability) as
where " ;t is Gaussian white noise processes with 0 mean and variance 2 and is the persistency parameters of shock. It is noteworthy that the shock is negative in t .
-Choice of Debt Firms (entrant and old) will choose the maximum possible level of debt only when the borrowing (enforcement) constraint is binding. To see this, let …rms maximize their equity value (13) subject to the borrowing constraint (18) . If we denote the corresponding Lagrange multiplier by ' t and substitute E t [J t+1 ] using J t = (1 )S t , the maximization exercise will become
First order conditions yield the following expression of the Lagrange multiplier
(1 )(1 )
Since we have that i = in the steady state, equation 21 could be rearranged to
From the above expression we can clearly see that in the steady state ' is positive if we restrict parameters , and to be in the interval between 0 and 1. Furthermore, we assume that shocks are 'small enough' as in Iacoviello (2005) and thus constraint is binding. This claim is formally summarized below.
Lemma 1
The borrowing constraint is binding in the steady state if workers have any bargaining power ( 2 (0; 1)) and the match separation probability is positive ( 2 (0; 1)).
Proof. Follows directly from the …rst-order conditions of …rms'optimization problem.
Final Good Producers and Price Setting
We assume that the …nal good producers take the intermediary good and sell it to households in the sticky prices (Calvo 1983 ) framework and do not participate in either the …nancial or the labour market. They produce according to the following production function where " is the elasticity of substitution and Y f t is the production of …nal goods
We assume that …nal goods are imperfectly substituted and that consumption is de…ned over the
The average price level of the …nal good P t , is known to be
where p t (i) is the nominal price of the …nal good produced in industry i and Y t (i) denotes aggregate demand for a good produced in the i-th sector. Each retailer chooses the sale price p t (i) and buys the intermediary good at a price p w t which is taken as given. The …nal good sale price p t (i) could only be changed with probability 1 $. Let us call the new price p t (i) and the corresponding demand
The …nal good producers' pro…t maximization problem could be written as follows
For the sake of simplicity, we can substitute
Pt+ . Now we rewrite the optimization problem
Because of the assumption that only a proportion of …rms could change the prices every period, we know that the price index evolves according to the following law of motion
Solving …nal good producers'optimization problem and using the law of motion of prices, we derive a standard New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
where variables with hats denote deviations from the steady state and =
Households
There is a continuum of agents of total mass 1 with a lifetime utility. At any point in time, agents can be employed (and receive wage for labour provided) with probability p E t or unemployed with probability 1 p E t . We follow Ravenna and Walsh (2011) and use a CRRA functional form for households'utility
where is a relative risk aversion. Households consume two kinds of goods: …nal goods C m t and domestically produced goods by unemployed agents captured by a(1 N t )
where a is the value of labour in domestic production (in real terms). We assume that everything that is produced in the economy is consumed by households, C m t , and …rms, kv t :
Using de…nition of labour market tightness, t , we rewrite equation 31 as
Rearranging (30) to C m t = C t a(1 N t ) and substituting it into (32), we obtain the economy's resource constraint
In addition, we show how the number of employed agents N t a¤ects output. For this purpose, substitute equations 5 and 33
This expression shows that output increases with N t . The household's liquidity position I t is de…ned as the sum of income received from employed members and value of domestically produced goods by unemployed members
We also let households hold assets that could be used as savings. Next period's assets A h t+1 (in nominal terms) are de…ned as follows
where W t is the nominal wage and the nominal pro…t of …rms is captured by t . Now we can state the household optimization problem
which leads to the following de…nitions. The marginal utility of consumption (in real terms)
and the interest rates
Combining the two above equations, we obtain household's Euler equation
Parametrization and Solution
We analytically solve for the steady state and use the values for simulating the model. Furthermore, we …nd that in the optimal steady state, prices are stable, that is = 1; where is the steady state in ‡ation. This result could be seen from the policy maker's optimization problem. As in Ravenna and Walsh (2011) we assume the period to be one quarter and set the discount factor to = 0:99. The bargaining power parameter is set to be equal to 0:5 because there is no direct evidence of a di¤erent estimate. Then, we follow Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) and set matching parameters & = 0:76 and = 0:5. The value of the constant & in the Cobb-Douglas matching function is consistent with the Hall (2003) estimate. Steady state productivity is normalized to 1 and we take the values of …rms'repayment probability , the cost of posting the vacancy k and value of labour in domestic production a from the Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari (2011) calibration. The price adjustment probability $ is taken to be standard and equal to 0:25 together with the price elasticity parameter " = 6 (Basu and Fernald 1997). We take relative risk aversion to have its usual value (for instance Ravenna and Walsh 2011) and set it equal to 2: Finally, we set persistence parameters of shocks to 0:9 to smooth the impulse response functions. All values are summarized in Table 1 in the appendix.
We solve the model by taking a log-linear approximation around the local and deterministic steady state. Shocks are assumed to be small enough and occurring in the neighborhood of the steady state and therefore, the equilibrium conditions are satis…ed.
Welfare Computation
We use the Benigno and Woodford (2012) methodology to compute the welfare measure and rank the policy rules according to their performance as is suggested in Damjanovic et al. (2011) .
To construct welfare measure, we let the policy maker optimize households'utility (equation 29) subject to the constraints of the economy captured by the following equations 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 34, 14, 18, 28 and 40. According to Benigno and Woodford (2012) , the general expression of the welfare approximation W t is given by
where U t is the household utility function, S W t are constraints, t:i:p: are terms independent of policy and O 3 are terms of the higher order which can be disregarded. We approximate welfare up to the second order (see Kim and Kim (2003) for details). System of equations is provided in the Appendix.
We use this algorithm to compare di¤erent monetary policy regimes and rank policy rules according to the welfare loss. Additionally, we look at the consumption equivalence, which shows how much consumption agents are willing to give up when in the optimal policy regime in order to be as good as in the other regime. Based on the households' utility function (29) we can write the following de…nition
where W O is the welfare measure in the optimal policy regime, W P is welfare in any other regime and x is de…ned the as consumption equivalence. Then x is given by
This is the consumption equivalence used in Table 2 expressed in percentage terms.
Monetary Policy
In this section, we investigate the policy maker's reaction to the …nancial market shock. First, we derive the optimal monetary policy reaction. Second, we introduce two policy rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993) . Finally, we rank monetary policy regimes according to the welfare measure and the consumption equivalence.
Optimal Policy
To derive the optimal policy reaction, we let the central bank maximize households'utility (29) subject to the behavioral constraints presented in equations 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, 28, 34 and 40 which are summarized in Table 3 provided in the Appendix. The formal speci…cation of the optimal monetary policy is showed in the Appendix.
Monetary Policy Rules
We consider these monetary policy rules: 1 (1) In ‡ation and unemployment response and (2) In ‡ation and …rms'borrowing response.
To investigate the monetary authority's preferences towards the response variables in the monetary policy rules, we search numerically for the values which would give the highest welfare. We consider all parameters in the intervals where Blanchard-Kahn (1980) conditions are satis…ed. The parameter values that we received from searching the highest welfare are provided in the table below. We use these to compute impulse response functions and compare monetary policy regimes. Table 1 As we can see from Table 2 , according to both welfare and consumption equivalence measures, the interest rate rule with in ‡ation and unemployment responses is better than the rule with in ‡ation and borrowing responses. Optimal policy, as expected, gives the highest welfare. 
Relation between Labour Market Response and Bargaining Power
In the previous literature (for example Faia (2008 Faia ( , 2009 ) and Proano (2012)), it was pointed out that the aggregate level of unemployment should have a relatively large positive coe¢ cient in the interest rate rule. In this section, we show that the sign next to the unemployment response in the Taylor rule depends on the extent of the bargaining power of workers.
To begin with, we set = 3:0 in the …rst policy rule from Table 1 and simulated the model for two cases: u = 2:0 and u = 0:01. Then we computed welfare for various values of workers bargaining power, , and provided the result in the left panel of Figure 1 . In addition, we calculated values of unemployment and borrowing in the steady state for the range of (depicted in the right panel of Figure 1 ). We have found that if < 0:5, then the policy maker should set u to 2:0 to achieve higher welfare; if > 0:5 then u should be 0:01.
To further illustrate the relation between workers bargaining power, borrowing, wage and surplus, we expressed wage and surplus as functions of borrowing in the steady state. They are given by the following expressions
where S b in (45) Expression 45 shows that borrowing has direct and value e¤ects on wage. The direct e¤ect decreases wage as borrowing increases and the extent of it depends on workers bargaining power. The value e¤ect increases with S and is negatively related to b. Therefore as borrowing falls (due to decrease in ) both e¤ects decrease wage as it is illustrated in Figure 2 .
The position that policy maker should respond negatively to unemployment in the policy rule when < 0:5 could be summarized as follows: when workers have little bargaining power, then in the steady state borrowing is high (this could be seen from expression 18), unemployment is low. This case is showed in Figure 1 , right panel. When the …nancial shock hits, falls and as a result borrowing drops as could be seen from equation 18. Then surplus increases at a decreasing rate (showed in Figure 2 , left panel) which reduces wage (Figure 2, right panel) . Also, notice that the convex shape of
has one more intuitive interpretation: when < 0:5 and borrowing is high, returns of one extra unit of debt increases surplus at an increasing rate as tends to 0: This means that as workers loose their bargaining power, wage is falling at a decreasing rate (which could also be seen from Figure 2 , right panel). In this case policy maker should respond negatively to unemployment in the policy rule and reduce interest rate. This encourages …rms to issue more debt which in turn decreases unemployment to the previous level. On the other hand, when > 0:5 borrowing is low (could be seen from expression 18), unemployment is high in steady state (shown in Figure 1 right panel) . The reason for this is the fact that the bargaining surplus now is large (due to small debt) and as a result wage paid to workers is high too. This decreases …rms demand for labor and therefore unemployment is high. When falls, borrowing is reduced which increases surplus and increases both wage and unemployment even further. As wage is higher, in ‡ation increases too. The central bank in this case should respond positively to an increase in unemployment and raise interest rates. This would discourage …rms to issue more debt and as a result bargaining surplus would increase bringing back wage and unemployment to the initial levels.
In addition, as could be seen from Figure 2 , left panel, when > 0:5 and falls, each extra unit of borrowing raises surplus at an increasing rate. When the value of workers bargaining power is large and deteriorates, wage decreases at higher rate than in the case when < 0:5:
To investigate how the optimal policy responds to …nancial market shock we have computed impulse responses of selected variables for di¤erent values of (bargaining power of workers) as in Faia (2009) . According to Hosios (1990) , when the workers bargaining power is equal to the share of unemployed workers in the matching function (captured by parameter ), unemployment is at the socially e¢ cient rate. If bargaining power is above this value, then equilibrium unemployment is larger than the socially optimum level and vice versa. When unemployment is below the optimal level ( < 0:5) …rms have to increase wage since there is a shortage of available workers; higher wages implies higher in ‡ation too. To mitigate such e¤ects occurring due to the …nancial market shock, monetary authority reduces interest rate which in turn stimulates borrowing thus reducing wage and lowering in ‡ation.
In contrast to Faia (2008 Faia ( , 2009 ) that investigated Ramsey monetary policy in the framework without the …nancial market, in this case …rms borrowing adds extra term which can increase or decrease bargaining surplus (equation 14) dependent on the interest rate and borrowing parameter . That is, central bank can alter the incentive of …rms to post vacancies by changing interest rate.
These …ndings are also similar to Blanchard and Gali (2010) where it is shown that optimal monetary policy should respond to both in ‡ation and unemployment ‡uctuations when the productivity shock hits. The presence of the labour market frictions which results in substantial ‡uctuations in unemployment is the reason why strict in ‡ation only response is not able to stabilize the economy. Therefore, the monetary authority should respond to both unemployment and in ‡ation as in Blanchard and Gali (2010). We …nd that such Taylor-type rule is the closest one to the optimal policy in terms of the welfare measure as it shown in Table 2 .
In summary, when according to the Hosios condition unemployment is above social optimum, the monetary authority (in optimal case) has to increase interest rate to reduce …rms borrowing. This in turn decreases level of unemployment as shown above. Whereas, when unemployment is below social optimum the central bank shifts its e¤orts towards reducing cost of in ‡ation. This is achieved by reducing interest rate and thus increasing …rms borrowing which in turn decreases both surplus and wage that causes unemployment to rise. As a result wage and in ‡ation fall as can be seen from Figure  3 .
Relation between the Financial and the Labour Market
To illustrate the channel through which the …nancial market in ‡uences the labour market, we computed the steady state wage and unemployment for di¤erent values of the borrowing parameter : As we can see from Figure 4 , a higher value of reduces unemployment and increases wage. We can distinguish two cases. First, if has a very high value, …rms can easily issue more debt, thus decreasing the bargaining surplus and wage. As a result unemployment falls. However, due to the decrease in unemployment, it is harder for …rms to …nd the right match and thus, they are forced to increase wage.
Second, if has a very low value, …rms cannot access the …nancial market and thus, borrowing is low and the bargaining surplus is large (as could be seen from equation 14) . For this reason, the wage paid to workers is high. As a result, unemployment increases as we can see from Figure 4 . Since unemployment is high, …rms can reduce the wage because it becomes easier to …nd a match. It is noteworthy that a similar relation between wage and unemployment is also found in some empirical studies, such as Apergis (2008) where 10 di¤erent OECD countries are examined in the period 1995-2005, …nding that wage decrease as unemployment increases. In addition, our result suggests that the less stringent borrowing constraint of …rms (higher value of ) decreases unemployment which agrees with Acemoglu's (2001) remark that easier access to the …nancial market may reduce unemployment. In the next section, we compute impulse response functions to illustrate how this mechanism works in more detail.
Response to a Financial Market Shock
We can see that the shock to the repayment probability t causes a signi…cant drop in …rms'borrowing and as a result of the mechanism described earlier, an increase in unemployment. This is intuitive, because as t drops, borrowing falls. The vacancy …lling probability q t is a¤ected through the same channel. As borrowing falls, bargaining surplus increases and hence, …rms start laying o¤ workers as can be seen in Figure 5 . This results in an increase in the vacancy …lling probability because now there are more available workers than vacancies and hence, it becomes easier for the …rm to …nd the right match for the posted vacancy. Figure 5 shows that the rule that entails a response to the labor market and in ‡ation, increases unemployment and interest rate. The optimal policy (shown in straight line) demonstrates the quickest convergence back to the steady state levels as compared to other regimes. Figure 5 , we can see that the mechanism described in the previous section does indeed work. For example, we can see that after …rms'borrowing falls (due to the reduction in t ), the bargaining surplus increases and workers receive lower wage (top left panel in Figure 6 ) in the next period since entrant …rms start paying wages only in the next period.
For old …rms, the wage dynamics could be explained in the following way. The wage that is paid to workers when the shock occurs had been bargained in the previous period and thus, cannot be changed. It means that the income received by parties over their lifetime will not change. But since both parties anticipate that the wage will increase in the future, the current wage has to fall. This can be seen in Figure 6 , top left panel. Furthermore, …rms prefer having a higher debt because it allows them to reduce their future wages. At the same time, workers anticipate this by demanding higher current wages for the given level of unemployment. Moreover, the dynamics of the model vary depending on which monetary policy rule is implemented. Consider the regime with in ‡ation and borrowing response …rst. As shown in Figure 5 , borrowing falls, but the surplus only increases in the next period because …rms issue debt based on the expected future surplus. As a result, there is a decrease in wage ( Figure 6 , top left panel) and output. Since borrowing falls, the interest rate also decreases because of the mechanism described in subsection 3.4.
In summary, it is clear that …rms'borrowing parameter t a¤ects the labour market through the wage bargaining process. To minimize the negative e¤ect of …nancial market shock, the central bank should use the interest rate rule with in ‡ation and unemployment responses as it is the closest one to the optimal policy in terms of the welfare measure.
Conclusion
In this note, we have presented an economy with labour and …nancial market frictions. We have used a matching model (Pissarides 1987) to account for the imperfections in the labour market and the enforcement constraint (as in Monacelli, Quadrini and Trigari 2011) to account for …nancial frictions which let us investigate the relation between …rms'borrowing and unemployment. Further to this, we have derived the optimal policy reaction of the central bank. Then, we have introduced two di¤erent Taylor type monetary policy rules and ranked them according to the consumption equivalence and the welfare measure which was computed using Beningno and Woodford (2012) methodology. The key …ndings can be summarized as follows.
First, due to relation between …nancial market and labour market the model suggests that changes in unemployment can be partially explained by the changes in …rms'credit market.
Second, the monetary policy rule with response to in ‡ation and labour market frictions (the aggregate level of unemployment) performs closest to the optimal policy in terms of the welfare measure and the consumption equivalence.
Third, the feedback on unemployment in the interest rate rule depends on the size of workers' bargaining power. Firms in our model are borrowing to reduce the bargaining surplus and therefore, the policy maker can indirectly in ‡uence the outcome of the wage bargaining process by changing the interest rate, thus altering the …rms'borrowing decision. If, for example, workers have much less bargaining power than …rms and negative …nancial shock hits, then the policy maker should reduce the interest rate, i.e. respond negatively to unemployment in the interest rate rule. This would encourage …rms to issue more debt (because of a lower interest rate), thus reducing the bargaining surplus and the wage which would stabilize unemployment. 
Appendix
Now we use the expression for the bargaining surplus (14) and substitute
b t+1 from (18):
Substitution of E t [S t+1 ] from (46) yields
Next, consider the net value of a worker given by V t U t (equations 15 and 16):
since we know that V t U t = S t , we can use this to simplify the above expression
Now, use equation (46) 
Finally, combining expressions (48) and (51) and solving for wage, we obtain
which is exactly the same as we have in the main text.
Optimal Monetary Policy
Policy maker's optimization problem is given by: 
